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INTRODUCTION 
Few politicians or actors of European 
integration still dare to refer to the first recital of 
the preamble to the Treaty of Rome, which has 
been reproduced in all succeeding EU treaties: 
‘Determined to establish the foundations of an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe'. On three 
occasions David Cameron tried to have the UK 
escape its implications but, ironically, the Brexit 
talks tend to demonstrate that the ‘ever closer 
union’ is very difficult to renounce. At the same 
time, those countries that have adopted the 
Euro must admit that further integration is 
needed if the common currency is to survive a 
new crisis.   
This European Policy Brief will first try to 
explain why this little sentence is important in 
the EU process. We will then look at how it fits 
with the Brexit saga on the one hand and the 
deepening of the Eurozone on the other. In the 
end, ever closer union is not just a recipe to 
prevent wars among European countries; it is 
also the only way for Europe to compete in 
today’s multipolar world. 
A PROCESS, NOT A PROJECT 
Why is the reference to an ‘ever closer union’ 
important? As the late Belgian Ambassador to 
the EU Philippe de Schoutheete used to say, this 
little sentence contains two fundamental 
principles: first, that the European construction 
is a process, not a specific project; then that the 
union is between peoples and not (only) 
between states. On the second point, Jean 
Monnet had made it clear: 'we bring union among 
people, not just cooperation among states', hence the 
legitimacy of the supranational dimension of the 
treaty.1  
 
As for the concept of an ‘ever-closer union’, it 
means that the European Union is defined not 
The EU Treaty objective of establishing ‘an 
ever closer Union among the peoples of 
Europe’ means that European integration is 
a step by step process requiring the use of 
supranational institutions. It has never been 
popular with nationalists and was strongly 
rejected by David Cameron in his quest for 
a EU reform deal in 2015-16. However, the 
Brexit negotiations demonstrate that 
renouncing it will only create harm, 
whichever ‘leave’ scenario is retained. Ever 
closer union is also required in the field of 
Economic and Monetary Union to help the 
Euro resist new potential threats. In effect, 
Europe has no choice but to integrate 
further if it wants to keep its place in an 
ever more competitive global world. 
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by its finality but by its movement: we do not 
commit to a federal Europe or to the United 
States of Europe. We are only committed to 
getting gradually closer to each other. Scalded by 
the illusory promises of the 1949 Hague 
Congress and the failure of the European 
Defence Community in 1953, the founding 
fathers relied on the wisdom of Jean Monnet 
and Robert Schuman, according to whom 
‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a 
single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements 
which first create a de facto solidarity.2  
STEP BY STEP   
It is the success of the European Coal and Steel 
Community that allowed the creation of the 
European Economic Community. To finally 
complete the internal market, the Rome treaty 
was adapted for the first time after 25 years. It is 
the Single European Act that made possible the 
creation of a political union in Maastricht. And 
so on, little by little - and not ‘according to a 
single plan’ - the Union became ‘ever closer’, not 
only between its original members, but by 
integrating the majority of the states on the 
continent. 
 
In the enthusiasm of the new millennium, a 
‘Constitutional’ treaty was concluded. Even if it 
was not a constitution, it frightened many 
citizens: the treaty was rejected by referendums 
in two of the founding countries, France and the 
Netherlands. This gave birth to a crisis that even 
today we have not truly overcome.  
 
Fortunately, EU leaders returned quickly to the 
method of small steps. While adding a lot of 
substance to the EU treaty basis and taking over 
all the institutional innovations of the famous 
Constitution, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty was 
presented as a modest complement to existing 
treaties, merely a new stage in the integration 
process. ‘A new stage’ means that it is not 
finished; but as for the finality, the Lisbon treaty 
is not more precise than the Treaty of Rome. 
THE ILLUSIONS OF BREXIT 
This step by step approach to the European 
construction gradually alienated British Prime 
Minister David Cameron. Already in his famous 
speech at London's Bloomberg headquarters in 
January 2013, he had asked for the UK to be 
allowed to escape the commitment to an ever 
closer union. He repeated his claim after having 
vainly opposed the appointment of Jean Claude 
Juncker as president of the Commission in 2014, 
to show his disdain for the procedure of the 
‘Spitzenkandidaten’. He later made it one of the 
four conditions to encourage him to vote 
Remain in the referendum he had imprudently 
planned for June 2016. 
 
To appease Cameron and complete the 
February 2016 agreement which was supposed 
to avoid Brexit, the European Council declared 
that the reference to an ‘ever closer union’ 
cannot prevent different Member States 'to take 
different paths of integration or force all Member States 
to aspire to a common destiny'. As we know, this 
concession of the 27 did not prevent the failure 
of the referendum on Brexit. But the reality of 
the negotiation on the withdrawal of the UK 
showed also that this concession was in fact 
poorly thought out. 
 
One of the lessons that can already be drawn 
from the painful exercise started nine months 
ago is that it is not possible to take 'different paths 
of integration'! One has to be in or out. There is 
no ‘cherry picking’ when it comes to the 
common market and its four freedoms. Theresa 
May had to admit it from the outset in the letter 
she sent to the EU 27 to launch the article 50 
procedure. The British want to recover their 
sovereignty, escape from the legal remit of the 
European Court of Justice, control immigration, 
and conclude trade deals with third countries. 
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But they can only achieve this by renouncing 
much of what has made their country 
prosperous in the last fifty years.  
 
All efforts by London until now to define a new 
relationship have failed to demonstrate that it 
will not bring harm. This is why it is so difficult 
for the British government to agree on any 
scenario for the future: staying in the internal 
market as a non-member deprives the country 
from participating in the decisions; staying in the 
customs union does not allow it to conclude 
deals with third countries; and leaving both only 
creates chaos.   
 
According to an internal report prepared by the 
British government and leaked at the beginning 
of February, the U.K. will be worse off after 
leaving the European Union in every likely 
scenario, even those in which it stays in the 
internal market. The report predicts that almost 
all sectors of the economy would be negatively 
affected in all the scenarios, with the hardest hit 
including manufacturing, food and drink, cars 
and retail. Only the agricultural sector would not 
be adversely affected in a no-deal Brexit. 
 
The 27 remaining EU members are impatient to 
receive, hopefully before the spring, a clear UK 
proposal for the future. But the probability that 
any proposal will be unrealistic or unfeasible is 
very high. It is revealing that the only proposals 
already on the table are requests for exceptions 
to Brexit: for citizens on both sides, for EU 
research programmes, aviation, nuclear issues, 
cooperation in counterterrorism, defence 
policy… Furthermore, the ambiguities in the 
agreement concluded in December on the 
‘regulatory alignment’ between Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland are another example 
of how difficult it will be to renounce the 
unnerving implications of the acquis 
communautaire. 
THE EVER CLOSER MONETARY UNION 
The most dramatic illustration of an ever closer 
Union being inescapable is the current debate 
on the further integration of the Eurozone.  
When the provisions on Economic and 
Monetary Union were introduced in the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the negotiators, while 
ambitious on the goal - that of creating a single 
currency - had to be cautious about the scope of 
solidarity commitments. 
 
But these precautions were challenged by the 
2008 financial crisis. To help Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal, a bailout system was required and 
to create the ‘European Stability Mechanism’ 
(ESM) the treaty itself had to be amended. The 
president of the European Central Bank, whose 
original mandate was merely to fight a non-
existent inflation, was finally allowed to do 
‘whatever it takes’ to save the Euro.  
 
This progress has been made ‘in the storm’ 
described by Herman Van Rompuy in his 
wonderful little book on his tenure at the helm 
of the Union. On top of this, the president of 
the European Council then encouraged the 
development of a ‘banking Union’: the 
European Central Bank was entrusted with the 
supervision of the so-called systemic banks and 
set up a resolution fund for bankrupt banks 
financed by the banks themselves. 
 
But economists agree that what has been 
decided so far is not enough for the Euro to be 
permanently safe from crises. The 'Banking 
Union' needs to be completed by pooling the 
national ‘deposit guarantee schemes’ in the event 
of financial institutions going bankrupt. There is 
also a need for greater integration of national 
fiscal policies and a centralisation of financial 
decision-making power, with the ESM 
becoming a EU agency and the creation of an 
‘EU finance minister’ position.  
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In other words, closer union among the 
members of the Eurozone is needed in one of 
the most sensitive areas of national sovereignty: 
fiscal policy. A negotiation will soon begin on 
this subject.  Even if the result is not in line with 
the ambitions of the federalists or the strongest 
supporters of a ‘two-speed Europe’, it will 
demonstrate that the Union must be ever closer 
among the members of the Euro area, simply to 
prevent the risk of a crisis that the single 
currency might not survive.  
EUROPE AS A POLE IN THE MULTIPOLAR 
WORLD 
Both examples above demonstrate that the little 
sentence on ‘an ever closer union’ does not only 
mean, as at the time of the Rome treaty, that the 
peoples of Europe have renounced to go to war 
against each other and that it is thus obsolete. 
On the contrary, its present scope is much larger 
than originally envisaged. In today's world, the 
peoples of Europe are no longer masters of the 
universe. They are, together, only one pole 
among others of the global world. It is only by 
sticking together, and by coming ever closer, 
that they will still be able to defend their 
interests against the established or emerging 
powers of the other continents. 
 
It will be very difficult, of course, to get this 
message out in the tabloids, or to convince a 
country that has never accepted the loss of 
sovereignty involved in EU membership to 
renounce the opportunity to regain it. But, 
unfortunately for our British friends, there is no 
third way. 
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